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Attribute-Based Encryption – Full Version
Yogachandran Rahulamathavan, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Recent trend towards cloud computing paradigm,
smart devices and 4G wireless technologies has enabled seamless
data sharing among users. Cloud computing environment is dis-
tributed and untrusted, hence data owners have to encrypt their
data to enforce data confidentiality. The data confidentiality in a
distributed environment can be achieved by using attribute-based
encryption technique. Decentralized attribute-based encryption
technique is a variant of multiple authority based attribute-based
encryption whereby any attribute authority can independently
join and leave the system without collaborating with the existing
attribute authorities. In this paper, we propose a privacy-
preserving decentralized key-policy attribute-based encryption
scheme. The scheme preserves the user privacy when users
interact with multiple authorities to obtain decryption keys while
mitigating the well-known user collusion security vulnerability.
We showed that our scheme relies on decisional bilinear Diffie-
Hellman standard complexity assumption in contrast to the pre-
vious nonstandard complexity assumptions such as q−decisional
Diffie-Hellman inversion.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, attribute-based encryption,
multi-authority, user collusion, anonymous key issuing protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent trend towards cloud computing, outsourcing, smart
devices, and high bandwidth mobile broadband has enabled
users to share information anywhere and anytime. Data could
be shared using public data storages such as cloud computing
infrastructure which can provide flexible computing capabili-
ties at reduced costs. Although this brings many benefits, there
are many unavoidable security problems since those facilities
are maintained by third party service providers [1].
Traditionally, data owners, users, and storage server are in
the same domain and the storage server is fully trusted [2]–
[10]. However, in cloud computing and outsourcing environ-
ments, data confidentiality is not guaranteed since the data
is stored and processed within the third party environment
[33]–[36]. Personnel information of the data owners and
commercial secrets of service providers can be leaked to
third party if the data owners store decrypted data in public
servers. To overcome this challenge, the data confidentiality
in a distributed environment can be achieved by applying
attribute-based encryption (ABE) technique [17]–[19]. ABE
is considered as a promising cryptographic technique for
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organizations who host their services in the cloud [11], [17]–
[19]. In fact, using ABE, the data owners can enforce fine-
grained access policies based on the nature of data. In ABE,
at least four different parties are involved namely data owner,
users, attribute authority and storage server (i.e., cloud).
The attribute authority is responsible for a set of attributes
and will be issuing encryption and decryption credentials to
the data owner and users, respectively. In order to get the
decryption credentials for a set of attributes, the user needs to
prove to the attribute authority that he is a legitimate user for
those attributes. Data owner will choose a set of attributes for
a particular data and will use the corresponding encryption
credential for those attributes to encrypt the data. Then the
encrypted data will be uploaded onto the cloud by the data
owner. If the user wants to access the encrypted data, then
he will first download the encrypted data from the cloud and
will compare whether he satisfies the set of attributes defined
by the data owner during the encryption. For instance, let us
assume, an employer uploads an encrypted file to the cloud
using ABE, where the access policy of that file is defined
using the following attributes and functions AND and OR:
“Manager” OR “Finance Office” AND “Company A”. Hence,
an employee who is a “Manager” employed at “Company A”
can decrypt the file.
There are two main types of ABE namely ciphertext-policy
ABE (CP-ABE) and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [18], [19].
In CP-ABE scheme, the access structure is assigned to the
ciphertext and each private key is associated with a set of
attributes. It must be noted that in CP-ABE, the data owner
must enforce the access structure together with encryption. The
user must have the private key to satisfy the policy in order to
decrypt the ciphertext [19]. In the KP-ABE scheme, the private
keys are associated with an access structure and the ciphertext
is labeled with a set of attributes. When the access structure
defined in the private key matches the attributes labeled with
the ciphertext, then it decrypts the ciphertext [18]. Both the
schemes have different applications in secure data sharing.
However, we consider only KP-ABE scheme in this paper.
Each ABE scheme can be further divided into two types:
single authority based ABE [18] and multiple authorities based
ABE (MA-ABE) [21] schemes. In a single authority based
ABE scheme, only one attribute authority is responsible for
monitoring all the attributes. In the MA-ABE scheme, in
contrast to the single authority ABE scheme, there are multiple
attribute authorities responsible for a disjoint sets of attributes.
The management of attributes is a crucial part in the ABE
2TABLE I
COMPARISONS OF ATTRIBUTE BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES RELATED TO THE PROPOSED SCHEME.
Ref. Year KP/CP-ABE AccessStructure Security Model
Decentralized
Attribute Authorities
User
Privacy
Sahai et al. [17] 2005 KP-ABE Threshold Selective Security No No
Goyal et al. [18] 2006 KP-ABE Tree Selective Security No No
Chase [20] 2007 KP-ABE Threshold Selective Security No No
Bethencourt et. al [19] 2007 CP-ABE Tree Selective Security No No
Chase et al. [21] 2009 KP-ABE Threshold Selective Security No Yes
Lewko et al. [23] 2011 CP-ABE LSSS Selective Security Yes No
Liu et al. [28] 2011 CP-ABE LSSS Full Security Yes No
Han et al. [15] 2012 KP-ABE Tree Selective Security Yes Yes
Our Scheme 2015 KP-ABE Tree Selective Security Yes Yes
systems. In reality, it is more convenient and secure to monitor
and maintain different sets of attributes by different attribute
authorities, e.g., in healthcare one authority can monitor at-
tributes of nurse and doctors while another authority monitors
attributes of administrators and human resources [12] or in
vehicular adhoc network (VANET), different identities can be
monitored by different authorities [13], [14]. The focus of this
paper is on multi-authority KP-ABE scheme. Let us review
some of the relevant works in multi-authority ABE schemes
followed by the decentralized schemes.
Related Works: Chase et. al. [20] presented a MA-ABE
scheme, which allows any polynomial number of independent
authorities to monitor attributes and distribute decryption keys.
In [20], the data owner chooses a number, i.e., mk for kth
attribute authority, and a set of attributes from each attribute
authority, and encrypts a message. This encrypted message
can be decrypted only by the users who satisfy mk number
of attributes from the kth attribute authority, k = 1, . . . , N .
However, a trusted central authority is needed for distributing
all the keys [20].
An improved MA-ABE scheme without central authority
has been presented by Chase and Chow in [21] where,
each pair of attribute authorities securely exchange a shared
secret among them during the set up process. In [20], users
must submit their global identity (GIDs) to each authority
to obtain the decryption credentials. This will breach the
user privacy since a set of corrupted authorities can pool
together all the attributes belong to the particular GID. In
order to mitigate this privacy vulnerability, Chase and Chow
proposed an anonymous key issuing protocol in [21], whereby
a user can obtain the decryption keys from attribute authorities
without revealing her GIDs. Even though the scheme proposed
by Chase and Chow eliminates the central authority, all the
attribute authorities must be online and collaborate with each
other to set up the ABE system. Hence, if one attribute
authority joins and/or leaves the system then the entire system
must be rebooted. Let us review the decentralized MA-ABE
schemes in literature.
In literature, various protocols have been proposed to de-
centralize the ABE scheme, however, each scheme has its
own merits and demerits. In a decentralized ABE scheme,
any attribute authority can independently join and/or leave
the system or issue keys to users without collaborating with
existing attribute authorities. Hence, this kind of scheme
eliminates the need that all the attribute authorities must be
online and interact with each other in order to setup the system.
Decentralized schemes for CP-ABE was proposed in [23],
[24], [26]–[28]. In particular, [23] constructs the first decen-
tralized multi-authority ABE scheme whereby any party can
become an authority and there is no requirement for any
global coordination other than the creation of an initial set of
common reference parameters. However, the schemes in [23]–
[28] do not preserve the user privacy i.e., attributes of users
can be collected by tracing users’ GIDs. For the first time,
Han et al. proposed a privacy-preserving decentralized scheme
for KP-ABE [15]. In contrast to the existing decentralized
ABE schemes, the scheme in [15] preserves the user privacy
and relies only on decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
standard complexity assumption. In [15], the GID of the user
is used to tie all the decryption keys together, where blind key
generation protocol has been used to issue the decryption keys.
Hence, corrupted attribute authorities cannot pool the users’
attributes by tracing the GIDs’ of the users from the decryption
keys. Unfortunately, the scheme in [15] cannot prevent user
collusion, hence, two users can pool their decryption keys to
generate decryption keys for an unauthorized user [16]. This
is due to weak bind between users’ GID and the decryption
keys.
In this paper, contrasting to all the works in literature, we
propose a strong privacy-preserving decentralized KP-ABE
scheme in order to mitigate the known user collusion security
vulnerability [16]. We exploit the anonymous key issuing
protocol in [21] to strengthen the bind between decryption
keys and GID as well as to preserve the user privacy. In order
to incorporate the anonymous key issuing protocol, we modify
the privacy-preserving decentralized KP-ABE scheme in [15].
We prove this by contradiction that the proposed scheme is
secure i.e., we reduce the DBDH standard complexity assump-
tion to show that an adversary who can break the proposed
scheme can be exploited to break the DBDH assumption. We
also proved that the anonymous key issuing protocol is free
from leak and selective-failure.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: we
provide notations and cryptographic building blocks required
3for the new algorithm in Section II. We propose the decentral-
ized KP-ABE algorithm and it’s security proof in Section III.
In Section IV, we describe anonymous key issuing protocol
and it’s security proof. Complexities of similar algorithms are
compared in Section V followed by Conclusions in Section
VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The following notations will be used throughout this paper.
We use x R←−−− X to denote that x is randomly selected from
X . Suppose Zp is a finite field with prime order p, by Zp[x],
we denote the polynomial ring on Zp. Let us explain the
building blocks used in this paper in the following subsections.
A. Lagrange Interpolation
Shamir’s secret share uses Lagrange interpolation technique
to obtain the secret from shared-secrets. Suppose that p(x) ∈
Zp[x] is a (k− 1) degree polynomial and secret s = p(0). Let
us denote S = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} and the Lagrange coefficient
for xi in S as
∆xi,S(x) =
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
x− xj
xi − xj
.
For a given k different number of values p(x1), p(x2), . . .,
p(xk), the polynomial p(x) can be reconstructed as follows,
p(x) =
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
x− xj
xi − xj
,
=
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)∆xi,S(x),
hence the secret s can be obtained as:
s = p(0),
=
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
0− xj
xi − xj
.
B. Bilinear Groups
Let G1, G2 be two multiplicative groups of prime order p,
generated by g1, g2 respectively. A bilinear map is denoted as eˆ
: G1 × G1 → G2, where it has the following three properties.
1 Bilinearity: ∀x, y ∈ G1, and a, b ∈ Zp, there is
eˆ(xa, yb) = eˆ(x, y)ab.
2 Non-degeneracy: eˆ(g1, g1) 6= 1 where 1 is the identity of
G2.
3 Computability: eˆ is an efficient computation.
C. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Complexity Assumption
The DBDH is one of the standard cryptographic complex-
ity assumption in contrast to other nonstandard complexity
assumptions such as q−decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion.
Let a, b, c, z R←−−−Zp, (eˆ, p,G1,G2) as bilinear parameters,
and g as a generator of G1. The DBDH assumption says
that in (eˆ, p,G1,G2), there is no probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary can distinguish [ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)abc] from
[ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)z] with non-negligible advantage. We will
use this property to prove by contradiction that our proposed
algorithm is secure against well-known attacks. Later in this
paper, we will show that if there is an adversary who can
break the proposed algorithm then we can use the adversary
indirectly to break the DBDH assumption (i.e., this is a
contradiction to the DBDH assumption, hence our proposed
algorithm is secure).
D. Commitment
A commitment scheme consists of three sub-algorithms:
Setup, Commit, and Decommit. The Setup outputs parameters
(i.e., params) for a particular security input. The Commit
outputs commitment (e.g., com) and decommitment (e.g.,
decom) parameters for a particular message and params. The
Decommit algorithm outputs 1 if the com matches the decom
for the message and params, otherwise it outputs 0.
E. Proof of Knowledge
We use the notation introduced in [31] to prove statements
about discrete logarithm. By
PoK
{
(α, β, γ) : y = gαhβ
∧
y˜ = g˜αh˜β
}
we denote a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of integers
α, β and γ. Conventionally, the values in the parenthesis
denote the knowledge that is being proven, while the rest
of the other values are known to the verifier. There exists
a knowledge extractor which can be used to rewind these
quantities from a successful prover.
F. Access Structure
Let {att1, att2, . . . , attn} be a set of attributes. A collection
A ⊆ 2{att1,att2,...,attn} is monotone if ∀B,C : if B ∈ A and
B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access structure (respectively, mono-
tone access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone
collection) A of non-empty subsets of {att1, att2, . . . , attn},
i.e., A ⊆ 2{att1,att2,...,attn}/{φ}. The sets in A are called
the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the
unauthorized sets [37]. In our context, we restrict our attention
to monotone access structures. However, it is also possible
to (inefficiently) realize general access structures using the
techniques given in [18].
We follow the same strategy used in [18] to build monotone
access structure using access tree. Let T be a tree representing
an access structure. Each non-leaf node of the tree represents a
threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold value.
If numx is the number of children of a node x and kx is its
threshold value, then 0 < kx = numx. When kx = 1, the
threshold gate is an OR gate and when kx = numx, it is an
AND gate.
Each leaf node x of the tree is described by an attribute
and a threshold value kx = 1. To facilitate working with the
access trees, we define a few functions. We denote the parent
of the node x in the tree by parent(x). The function att(x)
is defined only if x is a leaf node and denotes the attribute
associated with the leaf node x in the tree. The access tree T
also defines an ordering between the children of every node,
4that is, the children of a node are numbered from 1 to num.
The function index(x) returns such a number associated with
the node x. Where the index values are uniquely assigned to
nodes in the access structure for a given key in an arbitrary
manner.
Let T be an access tree with root r. Denote by Tx the
subtree of T rooted at the node x. Hence T is the same as Tr.
If a set of attributes γ satisfies the access tree Tx, we denote
it as Tx(γ) = 1. We compute Tx(γ) recursively as follows.
If x is a non-leaf node, evaluate T′x(γ) for all children x′ of
node x. Tx(γ) returns 1 if and only if at least kx children
return 1. If x is a leaf node, then Tx(γ) returns 1 if and only
if att(x) ∈ γ.
III. DECENTRALIZED KEY-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED
ENCRYPTION
In this section, we present our decentralized KP-ABE
scheme. In a decentralized scheme, it is not necessary to
maintain a fixed number of attribute authorities. Any at-
tribute authority can join and/or leave the system at any time
without rebooting the system. First of all, we will explain
sub-algorithms and security game followed by the privacy-
preserving decentralized KP-ABE. In Section IV, we incorpo-
rate the anonymous key issuing protocol to strengthen the bind
between user GID and decryption keys, hence, our scheme
mitigates the user collusion vulnerability found in [15].
A. Sub-algorithms
Our algorithm contains five sub-algorithms namely global
setup, authority setup, key issuing, encryption and decryption.
Let us briefly explain the functionalities of each sub-algorithm.
Global Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter as
input and output system parameters. These system parameters
can be used by authorities who join the system.
Authority Setup: Each attribute authority uses the system
parameters obtained from the global setup to generate public
and private keys for the attributes it maintains.
Key Issuing: User and attribute authority interact via anony-
mous key issuing protocol (see Section IV) in order to de-
termine a set of attributes belongs to the user. Then attribute
authority generates decryption credentials for those attributes
and send them to the user.
Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of attributes
maintained by attribute authority and the data as input. Then
it outputs the ciphertext of the data.
Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the decryption
credentials received from attribute authorities and the cipher-
text as input. The decryption will be successful if and only if
the user attributes satisfy the access structure.
B. Security Game
In order to avoid the security vulnerabilities, ABE schemes
should be proven to be secure against the selective identity
(ID) model [17]. In the selective ID model, the adversary
should provide the identities of the attribute authorities
(challenge identities) he wishes to challenge the challenger
with. Then challenger (i.e., the system) will generate necessary
parameters corresponding to the challenge identities and send
them to the adversary. Then the adversary is allowed to
make secret queries about the challenge identities. If the
adversary cannot decrypt the encrypted message at the end
with non-negligible advantage then the proposed scheme
is secure against the selective ID model. Formally, this is
represented by the following game between the adversary and
the challenger:
Setup
• Adversary sends a list of attribute sets and attribute au-
thorities including corrupted authorities to the challenger.
• Now the challenger generates public and private keys
corresponding to the attributes and authorities provided
by the adversary.
• Challenger provides public and private keys correspond-
ing to the corrupted authorities to the adversary while
only public keys corresponding to the remaining author-
ities to the adversary.
Secret Key Queries
• The adversary is allowed to make any number of secret
key queries as he wants against the attribute authorities.
• However, the only requirement is that for each user, there
must be at least one non corrupted attribute authority from
which the adversary can get insufficient number of secret
keys.
Challenge
• The adversary sends two messages m0 and m1 to the
challenger in plain domain.
• Now the challenger randomly chooses one of the mes-
sages and encrypt it and send the ciphertext to the
adversary.
More Secret Key Queries
• The adversary is allowed to make more secret key queries
as long as he satisfies the requirement given earlier.
Guess
• Now the adversary guesses which message was encrypted
by the challenger.
• The adversary is said to be successful if he guesses the
correct message with probability 12 + ǫ whereby ǫ is a
non-negligible function.
C. Construction of our new algorithm
Let us consider a system which contains N number of
attribute authorities (i.e., we denote them as A1, . . . , AN ).
The attribute set managed by the authority Ak is denoted
as A˜k = {ak,1, . . . , ak,nk} ∀k. Each attribute authority also
assigned a value dk i.e., user must have at least dk number of
attributes of this authority in order to retrieve the secret key
associated with this attribute authority. The complete algorithm
is given in Fig. 1. Let us explain the important steps involved
in Fig. 1.
Initially, for a given security parameter λ, global setup
algorithm (GS) generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with
prime order p i.e., {G1,G2} ← GS(1λ). The authority setup
5Global Setup GS
• For a given security parameter λ, GS generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with prime order p as follows:
{G1,G2} ← GS(1
λ)
• Let e : G1×G1 −→ G2 be a bilinear map and g, h and h1 be the generators of G1 such that ∀ x, y ∈ G1 and ∀ a, b ∈ Zp,
e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab
• There are N number of authorities {A1, . . . , AN}: Ak monitors nk attributes i.e. A˜k = {ak,1 . . . , ak,nk}, ∀k
Authorities Setup AS
• Security parameters of Ak: SKk = {αk, βk, and [tk,1, . . . , tk,nk ]} R←−−−Zp,∀k
• Public parameters of Ak: PKk = {Yk = e(g, g)αk , Zk = gβk , and [Tk,1 = gtk,1 , . . . , Tk,nk = g
tk,nk ]}, ∀ k
• Ak specify mk as minimum number of attributes required to satisfy the access structure ( mk ≤ nk)
Key Generation KG
• Collision-Resistant Hash Function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp to generate u from the user global identity
• Attribute set of user is A˜u: A˜u ∩ A˜k = A˜ku ∀ k
• Ak generates rk,u ∈R Zp and polynomial qx for each node x (including the leaves) T
• For each node x, the degree dx of the polynomial qx is dx = kx − 1 where kx – threshold value of that node
• Now, for the root node r, set qr(0) = rk,u
• For any other node x, set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x))
• Now decryption keys for the user u is generated as follows:
D =

Dk,u = g−αkh βkrk,u+u h rk,uβk+u1 , D1k,u = h 1rk,u+u , Djk,u = h
qak,j
(0)
(βk+u)tk,j
1 ,∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u


Encryption E
• Attribute set for the message m is A˜m: A˜m ∩ A˜k = A˜km,∀k, i.e. A˜m = {A˜1m, . . . , A˜km, . . . , A˜Nm}
• Data owner of message m randomly chooses s ∈R Zp, and output the ciphertext as follows:
C =
[
C1 = m.
∏
k∈IC
e(g, g)αks, C2 = g
s, C3 =
∏
k∈IC
gβksand
{
Ck,j = T
s
k,j
}
∀k∈IC ,ak,j∈A˜
j
m
]
where Ic denotes the index
set of the authorities.
Decryption D
• In order to decrypt C, the user u, computes X, Y and Qk as follows:
–
[
X =
∏
k∈IC
e (C2, Dk,u) , Y = e
(
C3, D
1
k,u
)
and Sk =
∏
ak,j∈A
k
m
e
(
Ck,j , D
j
k,u
)∆
ak,j ,A˜
j
m
(0)
]
• User then decrypts the message m as follows: m = C1X
Y
∏
k∈IC
Sk
Fig. 1. The proposed decentralized key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme.
algorithm (AS) is executed by each attribute authority to
randomly generate public keys (PK) and the corresponding
secret keys (SK). The public-secret key pairs for Ak is given
as {(Yk, Zk, [Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk ]), (αk, βk, [tk,1, . . . , tk,nk ])}.
Let us denote the attribute set belongs to user u as A˜u and
the common attribute set between user u and authority k as
A˜ku i.e., A˜ku = A˜u
⋂
A˜k . Key generation (KG) algorithm will
be used to issue decryption keys to the user u with a set of
attributes A˜u. The algorithm outputs a key that enables the user
to decrypt a message encrypted under a set of attributes A˜ku
if and only if T(A˜ku) = 1. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
First choose a polynomial qx for each node x (including the
leaves) in the tree T. These polynomials are chosen in the
following way in a top-down manner, starting from the root
node r. For each node x in the tree, set the degree dx of
the polynomial qx to be one less than the threshold value kx
of that node, that is, dx = kx − 1. Now, for the root node
r, set qr(0) = rk,u and dr other points of the polynomial
qr randomly to define it completely. For any other node x,
set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) and choose dx other points
randomly to completely define qx. Once the polynomials have
been decided, for each leaf node x, we give the secret value
Dk,u, D
1
k,u and D
j
k,u, ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u as shown in Fig. 1 to the
user. Note that, users’ unique identifier u is tied non-linearly
with each decryption key to strengthen the bind, hence the
vulnerability found in [15] can be mitigated with the proposed
approach.
Let us denote the set of attributes used to encrypt message m
as A˜m and the common attribute set between message m and
the authority k as A˜km i.e., A˜m = {A˜1m, . . . , A˜km, . . . , A˜Nm}.
Let us also denote the index set of authorities involved
in the ciphertext of message m as Ic. The encryption al-
gorithm (E) encrypts the message m ∈ G2 using an at-
tribute set A˜m. In order to encrypt the message, the mes-
sage owner randomly generates s and computes ciphertext
C =
[
C1, C2, C3, Ck,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜km
]
. If user has decryption
keys for the attributes of message m then he can obtain the
message m from the ciphertext using the following four steps
by executing the decryption algorithm (D). First, user can use
decryption key Dk,u and C2 to compute X as
X =
∏
k∈IC
e (C2, Dk,u) ,
=
∏
k∈IC
e
(
gs, g−αkh
βk
rk,u+uh
rk,u
βk+u
1
)
,
=
∏
k∈IC
e (g, g)
−sαk
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h)
sβk
rk,u+u
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h1)
srk,u
βk+u ,
6then user uses decryption key D1k,u and C3 to compute Y as
Y = e
(
C3, D
1
k,u
)
,
= e
( ∏
k∈IC
gβks, h
1
rk,u+u
)
,
=
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h)
sβk
rk,u+u ,
and uses Djk,u, Ck,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
j
m and polynomial interpolation
to get rk,u as
Sk =
∏
ak,j∈A˜km
e
(
Ck,j , D
j
k,u
)∆
ak,j∈A˜m,A˜
j
m
(0)
,
=
∏
ak,j∈A˜km
e
(
gtk,js, h
qak,j
(0)
(βk+u)tk,j
1
)∆
ak,j∈A˜m,A˜
j
m
(0)
,
=
∏
ak,j∈A˜km
e(g, h1)
s
(βk+u)
qak,j (0)∆
ak,j∈A˜m,A˜
j
m
(0)
,
where qak,j (0) = qparent(ak,j)(index(ak,j)). Hence,
Sk = e(g, h1)
srk,u
(βk+u) .
Now user can get the message m using C1 and pre-computed
values X, Y, Sk, ∀k as follows:
C1X
Y
∏
k∈IC
Sk
=

m.
∏
k∈IC
e(g, g)αks
∏
k∈IC
e(g, h1)
sβk,u
rk+u
 ×

∏
k∈IC
e (g, g)
−sαk
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h)
sβk
rk,u+u
∏
k∈IC
e (g, h1)
srk,u
βk+u
∏
k∈IC
e(g, h1)
srk,u
βk+u
 ,
= m.
D. Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is semantically secure
against chosen plain text attack (CPA) in the selective ID
model, if there exist negligible function υ such that, any
adversary will succeed the security game explained earlier
with probability at most 12 + υ.
Proof. Suppose if there is a probabilistic polynomial time
adversary who can break our algorithm then there will be a
challenger who can break the DBDH assumption by exploiting
the adversary. Lets assume that the challenger is provided with
[ga, gb, gc, Z] and if the challenger wants to break the DBDH
assumption then he needs to determine whether Z = eˆ(g, g)abc
or not with at least 12 + υ probability.
Let us assume that there is an adversary who can break
the proposed algorithm. In this section, we will show that
the challenger can use such an adversary to break the DBDH
assumption. In order to exploit such an adversary, the chal-
lenger needs to incorporate the given [ga, gb, gc, Z] within the
proposed algorithm (i.e., Fig. 1). First of all, let us explain how
the challenger incorporates [ga, gb, gc, Z] within the global
setup, authority setup, and key generation sub-algorithms. We
stress here that this incorporation is indistinguishable from the
steps provided in Fig. 1.
Initially, as explained in the security game, the adversary
must submit a set of attributes and a set of attribute authorities
he wants to challenge. Let us denote the set of attributes
provided by the adversary as A˜C = {A˜1C , . . . , A˜kC , . . . , A˜NC }
where A˜kC = A˜C
⋂
A˜k and a list of corrupted authorities
as CA. One of the conditions as given in security game
is that at least there will be one honest authority for each
user whereby the adversary can get insufficient number of
decryption credentials [20]. Let us denote GID of a particular
user as ω and the corresponding honest authority as κ, and it’s
access structure Tκ hence Tκ(A˜κC ∩ A˜κω) = 0. Hence, we can
divide the authorities who maintain attributes AC into three:
corrupted authorities, authorities who are not corrupted and
not κ, and κ. Firstly, challenger generates two random values
γ, η R←−−−Zp and sets h = g
agγ and h1 = ga
η
= gaη. For the
corrupted authorities Ak ∈ CA:
• The challenger generates vk, βk, wk,j R←−−−Zp and sets
Yk = e(g, g)
vk
, Zk = g
βk and {Tk,j = gwk,j}ak,j∈A˜k .
• Hence, the public-secret key pairs
for Ak ∈ CA is given as
{(vk, βk, [wk,1, . . . , wk,nk ]), (Yk, Zk, [Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk ])}.
• Challenger provides the secret-public key pairs of the
corrupted authorities to the adversary.
• Hence, the adversary can compute Dk,ω, D1k,ω, and
Djk,ω, ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
ω himself for user ω without interacting
with the challenger.
For the authorities who are not corrupted and not κ (i.e., Ak /∈
CA ∪ κ):
• Challenger generates vk, βk, wk,j R←−−−Zp and sets Yk =
e(gb, gvk) = e(g, g)bvk , and Zk = gβk .
• For the attributes ak,j ∈ A˜C ∩ A˜k , the challenger sets
Tk,j = g
wk,j
.
• Other attributes i.e., ak,j ∈ A˜k − A˜kC , the challenger sets
Tk,j = h
wk,j
1 = g
aηwk,j
.
• Hence, the public-secret key pairs for Ak /∈ CA ∪ κ is
given as
{(bvk, βk, wk,1, . . . , wk,nk ), (Yk, Zk, Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk)}.
• Challenger sends public keys
(Yk, Zk, Tk,1, [Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk ]) to the adversary.
• Now authority Ak assigns a polynomial qx with degree
dx for every node in it’s access tree Tk. It first sets up a
polynomial qx of degree dx for the root node x. It sets
qx(0) = rk,ω and then sets rest of the points randomly
to completely fix qx. Now it sets polynomials for each
child node x′ of x as follows: qx′(0) = qx(index(x′)).
• Then computes Dk,ω =
g−bvkg
(a+γ)βk
rk,ω+ω g
aηrk,ω
βk+ω , D1k,ω = g
a+γ
rk,ω+ω , and
Djk,ω = g
aηqparent(ak,j )
(index(ak,j ))
(βk+ω)wk,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜C ∩ A˜k
or Djk,ω = g
qparent(ak,j )
(index(ak,j )))
(βk+ω)wk,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜k − A˜kC
7If Ak = κ:
• Challenger generates βκ, wκ,j R←−−−Zp.
• Challenger sets Yκ = e(ga, gb)
n∏
j=1,j 6=κ
Y −1j =
e(g, g)
(
ab−
∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk−
∑
Ak∈CA
vk
)
, Zκ = g
βκ
.
• For the attributes aκ,j ∈ A˜C ∩ A˜κ, the challenger sets
Tκ,j = g
wκ,j
.
• Other attributes i.e., aκ,j ∈ A˜κ − A˜κC , the challenger sets
Tκ,j = h
wκ,j
1 = g
(aη)wκ,j
.
• Hence, the public-secret key pairs for
Ak = κ is given as [(ab −
∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk −∑
Ak∈CA
vk), βk, wk,1, ..., wk,nk , (Yκ, Zκ, Tκ,1, ...)].
• Challenger sends public keys (Yκ, Zκ, Tκ,1, ...) to the
adversary.
• Since Tκ(A˜κC ∩ A˜κω) = 0, it should be stressed that
maximum dx − 1 number of children of node x could
be satisfied. It first defines a polynomial qx of degree
dx for the root node x such that qx(0) = r′. For each
satisfied child x′ of x, the procedure chooses a random
point ex′ and sets qx(index(x′)) = ex′ . We will show
later in this section that it is possible to implicitly define
remaining children nodes using polynomial interpolation.
Now it recursively defines polynomials for the rest of the
nodes in the tree as follows. For each child node x′ of
x, qx′(0) = qx(index(x
′)).
• Computes Dκ,ω = g
(
−ab+
∑
Ak /∈CA∪k∗
bvk+
∑
Ak∈CA
vk
)
g
(a+γ)βκ
(r+ω) g
aηr′
βκ+ω ,
D1κ,ω = g
(a+γ)
(r+ω) , and Djκ,ω =
h
qparentaκ,j
(index(aκ,j ))
wκ,j
1 ∀aκ,j ∈ AC ∩ A˜k or
Djκ,ω = g
r′∆0,S(aκ,j )+
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j , ∀aκ,j ∈ A˜k − A˜kC
where r′ = r + b (βκ+ω)η .
The following lemma proves Dκ,ω and Djκ,ω are correct and
the challenger can generate these without knowing a, b, c
from ga, gb, gc.
Lemma 1. Dκ,ω and Djκ,ω are correct and they can be gen-
erated by challenger without knowing a, b, c from ga, gb, gc.
Proof. In the beginning of the access structure we chosen e1,
e2, . . ., edκ−1 random values for children nodes of root node
and we set qx(0) = r′ = r + b (βκ+ω)η . Hence, using the
polynomial interpolation technique, we can implicitly assign
values to other children nodes of root using the following valid
polynomial function:
qx = r
′∆0,S(x) +
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei∆i,S(x), S ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , dκ − 1}.
During the key extraction, for the correctness, the challenger
hides r′ in attribute aκ,j ∈ {A˜k − A˜kC}. Since, Tκ,j = h
wκ,j
1 ,
the Djκ,ω ∀ aκ,j ∈ {A˜k − A˜kC} is given as
Djκ,ω = g
qparent(aκ,j )
(index(aκ,j ))
wκ,j ,
= g
r′∆0,S(aκ,j )+
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j ,
which is valid and identical to that in the original scheme.
Now we will prove that the challenger can generate Djκ,ω and
Dκ,ω for aκ,j ∈ {A˜k − A˜kC} without knowing a, b, and c.
Djκ,ω = g
(r+b (βκ+ω)η )∆0,S(aκ,j )+
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j ,
= g
(r+b (βκ+ω)η )
∆0,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j
+
dκ−1∑
i=1
ei
∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j ,
=
[
gr
(
gb
)( βκ+ωη )]∆0,S(aκ,j )wκ,j dκ−1∏
i=1
g
ei∆i,S(aκ,j )
wκ,j ,
and
Dκ,ω=g
(
−ab+
∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk+
∑
Ak∈CA
vk
)
g
(a+γ)βκ
(r+ω) g
aηr′
βκ+ω
=g
(
−ab+
∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk+
∑
Ak∈CA
vk
)
g
(a+γ)βκ
(r+ω) g
aη(r+b
(βκ+ω)
η
)
βκ+ω
=g−abg
( ∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk+
∑
Ak∈CA
vk
)
g
(a+γ)βκ
(r+ω) g
aηr
βκ+ω gab
=g
( ∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
bvk+
∑
Ak∈CA
vk
)
g
(a+γ)βκ
(r+ω) g
aηr
βκ+ω
=
(
gb
)( ∑
Ak /∈CA∪κ
vk
)
g
( ∑
Ak∈CA
vk
)
h
βκ
r+ω h
r
βκ+ω
1 
Once adversary received all the credential from the challenger,
he will send two messages, m0 and m1 to the challenger.
Now the challenger randomly chooses one of the messages
and encrypts it and sends the encrypted message back
to the adversary. Let us denote the message chosen
by the challenger as mb where b = 0 or 1 and the
encrypted message as C = {C1 = mb.Z, C2 = gc, C3 =∏
k∈AC
(gc)
βkand {Ck,j = (gc)wk,j}∀k∈IC ,ak,j∈A˜jm}. We stress
here that C is a valid encryption of the message mb if
Z = e(g, g)abc. Hence, the adversary should have his
usual non-negligible advantage υ of correctly identifying
the message mb. However, when Z 6= e(g, g)abc, then C
is just random value, hence, the adversary can have no
more than 12 probability of guessing correctly. Hence, if
the adversary guesses correctly then challenger guesses that
Z = e(g, g)abc and if adversary is wrong then challenger
guesses that Z 6= e(g, g)abc, hence, the challenger has an
advantage of υ2 in distinguishing whether Z = e(g, g)
abc
.
Hence, an adversary who breaks our scheme with advantage
υ implies an algorithm for breaking DBDH assumption
with non-negligible advantage υ2 . We can conclude that the
proposed scheme is selective ID secure.
Theorem 2. Let ξ be a (t, qS , ǫ)-selective identity secure
IBE system (IND-sID-CPA). Suppose ξ admits N distinct
identities. Then ξ is also a (t, qS,Nǫ)-fully secure IBE
8User U(params, PKk, u) Authority Ak(params, PKk, SKk)
1. Randomly chooses u, ρ1, ρ2 ∈R Zp 2←−PC−−−→ x = (rk,u + u)ρ1, y = (βk + u)ρ2
PoK {(u, ρ1, ρ2) : Ψ1 = g
uρ1
∧
Ψ2 = g
ρ1
∧
Ψ3 = g
uρ2
∧
Ψ4 = g
ρ2}
2. Computes P = g
1
ρ1ρ2 , Q = h
1
ρ2 , R = h
1
ρ1
1
3. D˜k,u = P−αkQ
βk
x R
rk,u
y , D˜1k,u = Q
1
x ,
˜Djk,u = R
pk,u(ak,j )
ytk,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u
Let
∑
2 denotes the proof:
PoK
{
(αk, x, y,
βk
x ,
rk,u
y ) : D˜k,u = P
−αkQ
βk
x R
rk,u
y
∧
D˜k,u, D˜1k,u,
˜Djk,u,
∑
2
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
D˜1k,u = Q
1
x
∧˜Djk,u = R pk,u(ak,j )ytk,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku}
4. Dk,u =
(
D˜k,u
)ρ1ρ2
,
D1k,u =
(
D˜1k,u
)ρ1ρ2
,
Djk,u =
(
˜Djk,u
)ρ1ρ2
, ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u
Fig. 2. Anonymous key issuing protocol for decentralized KP-ABE
(IND-ID-CPA).
Proof. It has been shown by Boneh et. al in [34; see Theorem
7.1.] that, if any selective identity model is secure under
DBDH assumption then it is also fully secure (i.e., adaptive
identity). Consequently, if the system has sufficiently high
selective-identity security (which requires using a bilinear
group of sufficiently large size p) then the system is also
a fully secure with adequate security [34]. This means that
the selective-ID secure system proposed in this paper is fully
secure system in its own right, assuming we use a large enough
group so that the DBDH problem is sufficiently difficult.
IV. ANONYMOUS KEY ISSUING PROTOCOL
As described by Chase et. al., the ABE system comprises
of several types of authorities where some authorities require
public identities such as name or social security number of the
users to issue credentials [21]. In these cases the users will
need to identify themselves in any case in order to obtain the
decryption keys for a specific set of attributes. However, there
are many attributes, which do not belong to this category e.g.,
ability to drive a car. However, one should be able to prove
the ability to do something in an examination and then get the
corresponding credential, without presenting any identifying
information.
In an anonymous credential system [30,31,32], the users
can obtain and prove the possession of credentials while
remaining anonymous. In such work it is assumed that each
user has a unique secret key. We can assume that this secret
key could be the users GID. Then the user can interact
with each authority under a different pseudonym (generated
using GID) in such a manner that it is impossible to link
multiple pseudonyms belonging to the same user. There are
two efficient secure protocols in literature to prove that a given
secret key is valid and to prevent users from loaning out their
keys [30,31,32]: public-key infrastructure (PKI)-assured non-
transferability and all-or-nothing non-transferability. In PKI-
assured non-transferability, sharing a key implies also sharing
a particular, valuable secret key from outside the system (e.g.,
the secret key that gives access to the user’s bank account). In
all-or-nothing non-transferability, sharing just one pseudonym
or credential implies sharing all of the user’s other credentials
and pseudonyms in the system, i.e., sharing all of the user’s
secret keys inside the system.
In the proposed work, we exploited anonymous credentials
to allow the users to obtain decryption keys from the authori-
ties without revealing their GIDs. The basic idea is to let the
GID play the role of the anonymous credential secret key. The
user obtains anonymous credentials as explained earlier. When
the user wants to obtain decryption keys corresponding to a set
of attributes, he proves (via the anonymous credential system)
that he is the owner of a credential for these attributes. Then
he uses the ABE system to obtain decryption keys.
In particular, in the proposed key issuing protocol, we
coupled the properties of anonymous credential system with
ABE. Hence, the user can obtain a set of decryption keys for
his secret GID without revealing any information about that
GID to the authority (preserve the privacy). At the same time,
the authority is guaranteed that the agreed upon decryption-
keys are the only information that the user learns from the
transaction (i.e., provide security by mitigating user collusion).
The anonymous key issuing protocol preserves the user’s
identities from the authorities. Hence, the authorities do not
know the user’s GID nor can cause failures for certain
GID’s. This concept is from blind IBE schemes [32]. We de-
fine this algorithm as [U(params, PKk, u,GID, decom)⇆
Ak(params, PKk, SKk)] → DecryptionKeysforUser. In
this algorithms, the user runs Commit and sends the com to
authority and keeps the decom. Then the user and authority
interact with each other to generate decryption keys. The
9decryption keys for the user will be generated only if the
output of Decommit is 1.
From [32], the anonymous key extraction protocol should
satisfy the following two properties: leak-freeness and
selective-failure blindness. Leak-freeness requires that by ex-
ecuting the anonymous key issuing algorithm with honest
authorities, the malicious user cannot find out anything which
it is supposed to know by executing the algorithm with-
out privacy preservation with the authorities. Selective-failure
blindness requires that malicious authorities cannot discover
anything about the users identifier and his attributes, and
cause the algorithm to selectively fail depending on the users
identifier and his attributes. These two properties can be
formalized by using the following games.
A. Security Games
Leak-Freeness. This game is defined by a real experiment
and an ideal experiment. In real experiment, the user (adver-
sarial user) and authority interact with each other using the
proposed anonymous key issuing protocol. Hence, the user
will obtain randomized decryption keys. However the user will
be able remove the randomness to get decryption keys. In an
ideal experiment, there will be a simulator that will interact (on
behalf of user) with trusted authority to obtain decryption keys
(without randomization). The proposed algorithm is free from
leak only if no efficient distinguisher can distinguish whether
the user is executing real or ideal experiments.
Selective-failure Blindness. In this game, the authority
(adversarial) outputs pair of GIDs (i.e., GID0 and
GID1). Then the adversary given with commitments
comb and com1−b where b ∈ {0, 1} and black
box access to U(params, PKk, GIDb, decomb) and
U(params, PKk, GID1−b, decom1−b). The algorithm U
interact with the authority and output decryption keys
i.e.,
(
SKub , SKu1−b
)
. The proposed algorithm is blind to
selective-failure if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
has non-negligible advantage over identifying b.
B. Construction of anonymous key issuing protocol
Fig. 2 shows the anonymous key issuing protocol where
user with private value u ∈ Zp and an authority Ak with pri-
vate values rk,u, βk and αk ∈ Zp jointly computing decryption
keys for user. The decryption keys for user u are Dk,u, D1k,u
and Djk,u ∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku. In order to obtain these keys, first
user and Ak interact with each other using two-party protocol
(2PC). The 2PC protocol can be done via a general 2PC
protocol for a simple arithmetic computation. Alternatively,
we can do this more efficiently using the construction in [22].
The 2PC protocol takes (u, ρ1, ρ2) ∈ Zp from user and
(rk,u, βk) ∈ Zp from Ak and returns x = (u+ βk)ρ1 mod p
and y = (u + rk,u)ρ2 mod p to Ak . Since, ρ1 and ρ2 were
randomly generated by user, the authority Ak cannot extract
the user identity u from x and y. After executing the 2PC
protocol, the user now computes P = g
1
ρ1ρ2 , Q = h
1
ρ2
and R = h
1
ρ1
1 and send those values to Ak . Now Ak
computes D˜k,u, D˜1k,u and
˜Djk,u ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u (i.e., randomized
decryption credentials) using P, Q, R, x and y and send them
back to the user. Now the user exponentiates the obtained
values by ρ1ρ2 to get the decryption keys. Note that, since u
coupled non-linearly within the decryption keys, user collusion
is not possible [21].
C. Security Analysis
To obtain the decryption credential blindly from the au-
thority Ak ∀k, the user needs to prove that he holds the
identifier u in zero knowledge. As shown in Fig. 2, the
user randomly generates ρ1, ρ2 ∈R Zp and computes Ψ1 =
guρ1 ,Ψ2 = g
ρ1 ,Ψ3 = g
uρ2 , and Ψ4 = gρ2 as commit-
ments. At the end of the 2PC protocol, the authority obtains
x = (rk,u + u)ρ1 mod p, y = (βk + u)ρ2 mod p. Then
authority verifies gx ?= ABrk,u and gy ?= CDrk,u . If they
are correctly verified then the authority continues otherwise it
aborts.
Now authority needs to proof that he knows (αk, βkx ,
rk,u
y )
in zero knowledge to the user. This will be done using the
following steps:
1. Ak randomly generates b1, b2, b3 ∈R Zp, computes
˜
Dk,u = P
−b1Qb2Rb3 and sends ˜Dk,u, and D˜k,u to the
user
2. User generates c1 ∈R Zp and sends it to the authority
3. Authority computes b′1 = b1−c1αk, b′2 = b2−c1
βk
x , b
′
3 =
b3 − c1
rk,u
y and sends b
′
1, b
′
2, b
′
3 to the user
4. User verifies ˜Dk,u
?
= P−b
′
1Qb
′
2Rb
′
3D˜k,u
c1
, otherwise
aborts
We ignored the zero-knowledge proofs for 1x and
1
y for
brevity since they are similar to the above proof.
Theorem 3. The proposed anonymous key issuing protocol is
both leak-free and selective-failure blind.
Proof. Leak freeness. Suppose there exists an adversary U
in the real experiment (where U is interacting with an honest
authority Ak running the anonymous key issuing protocol) and
a simulator U˜ in the ideal experiment (where U˜ can access
the trusted authority running the key issuing protocol without
privacy preservation) such that no efficient distinguisher D
can distinguish the real experiment from the ideal experiment.
The simulator U˜ simulates the communication between the
distinguisher D and the adversary U by passing the input of
D to U and the output of U to D. The simulator U˜ works as
follows:
1. U˜ sends the adversary U the public-key PKk of Ak
2. The adversary U must proof the possession of u in zero-
knowledge to U˜. If proof is successful then U˜ obtains
(u, ρ1, ρ2) using rewind technique
3. U˜ sends u to the trusted party. The trusted party runs
KeyGen to generates (Dk,u, D1k,u, Djk,u) and responds to
U˜
4. Now U˜ computes
(
Dk,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , D1k,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , Djk,u
1
ρ1ρ2
)
and
sends them to U
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If (Dk,u, D1k,u, Djk,u) are correct keys from the
trusted authority in the ideal experiment, then(
Dk,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , D1k,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , Djk,u
1
ρ1ρ2
)
are the correct keys
from Ak in the real experiment. Hence, (Dk,u, D1k,u,
Djk,u) and
(
Dk,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , D1k,u
1
ρ1ρ2 , Djk,u
1
ρ1ρ2
)
are correctly
distributed and no efficient distinguisher can distinguish the
real experiment with the ideal experiment.
Proof. Selective-failure blindness. The adversarial authority
Ak submits the public key PKk, and two GIDs u0 and
u1. Then, a bit b ∈ {0, 1} is randomly selected. Ak can
have a black box access to u0’s and u1’s parameters i.e.,
U(params, PKk, ub) and U(params, PKk, ub−1). Then, U
executes the anonymous key issuing protocol with Ak and
outputs secret keys for ub and u1−b i.e., SKub and SKu1−b .
1. If SKub 6=⊥ and SKu1−b 6=⊥ then Ak is given (SKub ,
SKu1−b)
2. If SKub 6=⊥ and SKu1−b =⊥ then Ak is given (ǫ, ⊥)
3. If SKub =⊥ and SKu1−b 6=⊥ then Ak is given (⊥, ǫ)
4. If SKub =⊥ and SKu1−b =⊥ then Ak is given (⊥, ⊥)
At the end Ak submits his prediction on b.
In the anonymous key issuing protocol, U sends four
random parameters Ψ1 = gubρ1 ∈ G1,Ψ2 = gρ1 ∈ G1,Ψ3 =
gubρ2 ∈ G1, and Ψ4 = gρ2 ∈ G1 to the adversarial authority
Ak and proves PoK(ub, ρ1, ρ2). Now it is Ak’s turn to
respond. So far, Aks view on the two black boxes is com-
putationally undistinguishable. Otherwise, the hiding property
of the commitment scheme and the witness undistinguishable
property of the zero-knowledge proof will be broken. Suppose
that Ak uses any computing strategy to output secret keys
{Dk,ub , D
1
k,ub
, Djk,ub∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
ub} for the first black box. In
the following, we will show that Ak can predict SKub of U
without interacting with the two black boxes:
1. Ak checks
PoK
{
(αk,
βk
x ,
rk,u
y ) : D˜k,u = P
−αkQ
βk
x R
rk,u
y
∧
D˜1k,u = Q
1
x
∧˜Djk,u = R pk,u(ak,j)ytk,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku}
If proof fails, Ak sets SK0 =⊥
2. Ak generates different secret keys
{Dk,ub , D
1
k,ub
, Djk,ub∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
ub} for the second
black box and a proof of knowledge:
PoK
{
(αk,
βk
x ,
rk,u
y ) : D˜k,u = P
−αkQ
βk
x R
rk,u
y
∧
D˜1k,u = Q
1
x
∧˜Djk,u = R pk,u(ak,j)ytk,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜ku}
If proof fails, Ak sets SK1 =⊥
3. Finally Ak outputs his prediction on (u0, u1) with (SKub ,
SKu1−b) if SKub 6=⊥ and SKu1−b 6=⊥; (ǫ, ⊥) if
SKub 6=⊥ and SKu1−b =⊥; (⊥, ǫ) if SKub =⊥ and
SKu1−b 6=⊥; (⊥, ⊥) if SKub =⊥ and SKu1−b =⊥.
The predication on (u0, u1) is correct, and has the identical
distribution with the black box. Because Ak performs the
same check as the honest U , it outputs the valid keys as
U obtains from anonymous key issuing protocol. Hence, if
Ak can predict the final outputs of the two black boxes, the
advantage of Ak in distinguishing the two black boxes is the
same without the final outputs. Therefore, the advantage of
Ak should come from the received Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3,Ψ4 ∈ G1 and
PoK(u, ρ1, ρ2). From the hiding property of the commitment
scheme and witness undistinguishable property of the zero-
knowledge proof, Ak cannot distinguish one from the other
with nonnegligible advantage. Hence our anonymous key
issuing protocol is secure against selective-failure.
V. COMPLEXITY COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the computational complexity
of our scheme against the following KP-ABE schemes: Han
et. al decentralized KP-ABE scheme [15], Chase MA-ABE
KP-ABE scheme with central authority [20], and Chase et.al
MA-ABE KP-ABE scheme without central authority [21]. Let
us assume there are N number of attribute authorities and
each authority monitors n number of attributes. In order to
compare the complexity at worst case scenario, let us assume
that the ciphertext encrypted using all the attributes in the
system (i.e., nN ) and user has decryption credentials for all
the attributes. Let us denote the computational time (in ms)
for one multiplication, one exponentiation, and one pairing as
Cm, Ce, and Cp, respectively.
The Table II compares the complexities in all four sub-
algorithms and length of ciphertext. From the Table II, it is
obvious that the centralized algorithms in [20], [21] have lower
computational complexity than the decentralized schemes pro-
posed in this paper and in [15]. However, since the algorithms
in [20], [21] need a central authority and/or interaction among
authorities, they are vulnerable for single point of failure.
Since the number of pairing operations (i.e., Cp) equal in both
the proposed and [15], they share same order of computational
complexity. However, the proposed algorithm mitigates the
user collusion vulnerability compared to [15]. Finally, the size
of the ciphertext in all four algorithms are almost equal.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving key-policy
attribute-based encryption scheme for a distributed data shar-
ing environment. The proposed scheme enables users to down-
load and decrypt the data from online such as cloud without
revealing their attributes to the third-parties. The novelty
of the work is to mitigate the user collusion attack in the
existing scheme. We used anonymous key issuing protocol to
strengthen the bind between user identity and decryption keys,
hence, two or more users cannot pool their keys to generate
decryption keys for an unauthorized user. We validated the
security of the proposed scheme using the decisional bilinear
Diffie-Hellman standard complexity assumption.
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